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The Klein-Leffler (1981) model of product quality does not
explain why high-quality firms would dissipate the rents they
earn from quality-assuring price premia, and it relies on
consumers knowing the cost functions of firms. In the present
paper, consumers do not know any firm's cost of producing
quality goods, so high-quality firms must engage in conspicuous
spending to demonstrate they earn a profitable mark-up over
cost. Complete rent dissipation occurs only when high and low
cost firms have the same cost of producing low quality.I. The Klein-Leffler Model and Profit Dissipation
Introduction
When consumers are unaware of product quality before they
buy, producers can nonetheless be punished for providing low
quality by losing repeat business. Benjamin Klein and Keith
Leffler (1981) demonstrate that, under fairly general
conditions, a price greater than the competitive, zero-profit
price will induce producers to deliver the promised quality
level. At the zero-profit price, the profit from low quality
exceeds the profit from high quality, even if no customers
return. If a firm's price equals its average cost, repeat
business is a matter of indifference. A higher price, however,
increases long-run profit more for firms that provide the
promised quality than for firms with lower quality because
repeat business does then generate positive profits. At a
sufficiently high price, the profit from not shirking on quality
will exceed the profit from shirking. At that price, firms will
provide the promised quality level.
1
Two points are of interest in the Klein-Leffler (henceforth
K&L) model. First, positive profit apparently exists in a
competitive market. K&L assert that all such profit will be
                    
1 Rasmusen (1994, pp.131-134) contains a game-theoretic approach to the Klein-
Leffler model and notes the similarity of a quality-assuring price and an
efficiency wage.2
competed away as firms invest in firm-specific capital
expenditures, but we will cast doubt on that below. Second,
because consumers believe a high price gives firms an incentive
to produce high quality only if such a price generates a
sufficiently high profit, for a price premium to ensure high
quality, consumers must know firms' production cost.
In this paper, we address both points. We argue there is no
incentive for firms to compete via capital expenditures in the
K&L model. Positive profit will indeed persist in equilibrium,
even with free entry. Also, while the K&L model assumes
producers have identical costs, though they can choose different
quality levels each period, we will add the possibility firms do
not have the same marginal cost of producing quality and buyers
have incomplete information regarding firms' costs. Thus, we
will combine moral hazard and adverse selection in a product
quality model.
    We will show that a price premium is necessary for any firm
to produce high quality with either complete or incomplete
information. Under complete information, capital spending is
neither necessary nor of any value to firms since it neither has
a direct benefit nor signals hidden information. Under
incomplete information, capital spending may be required for low
cost firms to signal their cost since consumers can not observe3
the mark up of price over marginal cost and use it to deduce a
firm's profitability.
In the rest of this section, we consider profit dissipation
in the K&L model. In Section II, we introduce a simple model of
quality uncertainty with moral hazard and adverse selection.
Further elaboration and concluding comments are in Section III.
Profit dissipation
In the K&L model, a price, P*, above average cost, PC, is
necessary to induce firms to deliver the high level of quality
they promise to consumers. Entry cannot eliminate the resulting
profit since additional output will drive price below the
quality-assuring level of P*. This is a surprising result: an
industry known to be earning positive profit, without collusion
or conventional barriers to entry, and yet without expanded
output or entry.
2
     Almost offhandedly, K&L suggest non-price competition will
dissipate this profit. They realize non-price competition cannot
reduce the operating margin by driving average cost up closer to
                    
2 More precisely, P* must exceed not "average cost," but avoidable costs each
period after the firm is established. Thus, if "average cost" is defined to
include start-up costs, amortized over the lifetime of the firm, P* does not
necessarily exceed average cost. If "average cost" is defined to include the
total costs of production in a given period divided by the quantity of
production, however, while marginal cost is just the incremental cost of one
more unit of output in that period, the key to the Klein-Leffler model is for
P* to exceed average cost, not marginal cost.4
price, but they suggest some kind of fixed cost might absorb the
profit:
Competition to dissipate the economic profits earned by
     existing firms must therefore occur in nonprice dimensions...
     The competition involves firm-specific capital expenditures.
3
Such thinking comes naturally to economists, since we hold
the maxim that "Markets abhor a profit" as dearly as physics'
"Nature abhors a vacuum". Consider two situations with no
quality uncertainty. Suppose each firm is a price taker, the
long-run, competitive (i.e. market-clearing and zero-profit)
price is PC, and the number of firms is N1. In Case I, the N1
firms form a cartel, restrict output, and the resulting price is
P ˆ, with P ˆ greater than PC. In this well-known problem, each
cartel member, as a cheater, has MR ” P ˆ > MC and will try to
sell additional output via secret price cuts or non-price
methods of attracting additional sales. Moreover, even if the
cartel members do not increase their output, entrants will add
new output to the market. There will be a strong tendency for
profit to fall to zero.
4
  In Case II, government regulates the market: entry is
restricted so fewer than N1 firms are allowed to produce, with
the number of firms chosen to again yield P = P ˆ. Now firms will
                    
3 Klein and Leffler (1981), p.626.
4 In his analysis of price and non-price competition, Stigler (1968) considers
the case of a cartel as in Case I.5
earn positive profit and would like to expand capacity (and new
firms would like to enter), but, unlike Case I,
P (” MR) = MC, so firms have no incentive to compete for
additional sales via price or non-price competition. Firms earn
rents to their favored regulatory status.
5
Empirical evidence in support of positive profit with
capacity restrictions is found in the taxicab "medallion"
problem, where the license (medallion) to operate an independent
cab in New York City sold for about $17,000 in 1959
6 and about
$30,000 in 1969.
7 Also, Breen (1977) found an average value of
over $700,000 in 1971 for operating certificates for household
movers subject to Interstate Commerce Commission regulation. In
either case, presumably the sale price for an operating
certificate reflects the discounted value of expected profit
using the certificate.
In the K&L model, the high price is not maintained via a
capacity restriction. Rather, new firms do not enter and
existing firms do not expand capacity because greater output
will reduce price below the level that assures product quality,
                    
5 Airlines may have competed via non-price mechanisms (e.g. zero price drinks,
plush seats, etc.) when entry into the airlines industry was regulated by the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). However, in addition to entry restrictions,
CAB also set price. If price was set above the market-clearing level, there
would have been an incentive for firms to compete via non-price mechanisms.
6 See Friedman (1962), p.282.
7 See Becker (1971), p.97.6
in which case consumers would cease to purchase the product.
8 In
Case II above, existing firms want to expand capacity, but will
not compete for additional sales without the additional
capacity. Like Case II, in the K&L model, P (” MR) = MC, so firms
will not compete for new customers.
2. A Model of Incomplete Information
Consider a model similar to that proposed by K&L, but in
which some firms, Discount firms, have higher costs of producing
high quality than other firms, Premium firms. Consumers cannot
directly observe a firm's type. A firm charging a high price
might be a Premium firm willing to deliver high quality, or it
might be a fly-by-night Discount firm that intends to deliver
low quality. Premium firms will have an incentive to distinguish
themselves from Discount firms by investing in a signal. We
assume Premium firms may invest in conspicuous spending, S, on
items that involve sunk cost. Although this investment in assets
with sunk cost is similar to that proposed by K&L, the addition
of incomplete information to the model is necessary for firms to
wish to make this kind of investment.
                    
8 Presumably, a price below the level which assures high quality will result
in zero units purchased by consumers since they realize only low quality is7
The Model
(0)  Nature chooses a large number (relative to the number of
     buyers) of firms (Premium firms) with a marginal cost of
     high quality equal to c. Other firms (Discount firms), of
     which there also is a large number, have a marginal cost of
     high quality equal to c , c < c . Each firm has the capacity
     to produce one unit of output. There is zero cost for low
     quality.
(1)  Each firm chooses a level, S, of conspicuous spending, paid
     at the end of the period, if this is its first period of
     entry and it has never chosen S > 0 before.
(2)  Each firm chooses a price, P, for the unit it sells.
(3)  Each firm chooses a quality, q, of either 0 or 1,
     unobserved by consumers, paying the cost at the end of the
     period.
(4)  Each consumer decides where to buy, paying at the end of
     the period.
(5)  After one period, each consumer learns the quality of all
     units purchased.
9
(6)  The game returns to (1) and repeats forever.
                                                                 
forthcoming at such a price.8
Payoffs
Everyone uses the discount rate r. A firm commits to
production cost at the start of each period, with the cost
incurred at the end of the period. Consumers pay their price and
receive their consumption value at the end of the period.
Consumers lie on the continuum from 0 to infinity, indexed by
their reservation price V for the one unit of a high-quality
product of value q = 1 they would purchase, and all consumers
place zero value on q = 0. If the price is P, market demand for
high-quality goods is X(P), with X' < 0 and X(c) > 2; i.e.
market demand slopes down and is strong enough to support at
least two firms.
Discussion of Assumptions
We assume each firm can only produce one unit simply for
convenience. This fixed capacity assumption (L-shaped MC) allows
a simple analysis of the difference between the complete and
incomplete information cases.
K&L demonstrated the generality of the existence of a
quality-assuring price. We do not disagree with this result,
but, as argued in the previous section, we question the K&L
                                                                 
9 If it takes longer than one period for consumers to learn quality, profit
from low quality is higher, so the quality-assuring price would also be
higher.9
argument that profit will be dissipated in a world of complete
information (i.e. a world with no adverse selection).
The Full Information Case: Quality Observable Before Purchase
As a first benchmark, let us consider the case where
consumers can observe quality before they purchase. Clearly each
firm active in the market will produce one unit of high quality
since consumers will not buy low quality. The price must be
P = c, since any higher price would create profit that would
induce entry. Output will be X(c), produced by X(c) Premium
firms.
The Complete Information Case: Just Moral Hazard
As a second benchmark, let us consider the case where all
possible firms are Premium firms, but consumers cannot observe
quality before they purchase. This is the situation K&L
described in their 1981 paper.
If Discount firms do not exist, the problem is to induce
Premium firms to set q = 1. A premium firm that sets q = 1 has
present value of profit, p, equal to:
r
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 A firm that cheats and sets q = 0 would be discovered
after one period. Suppose such a firm would subsequently have





= .                                        (2)
Assuming consumers exist who will pay such a price, let P*
equal the quality-assuring price, that is the price at which
Premium firms are just willing to set q = 1. The market clears
at output of X(P*) with fewer firms than would result with
perfect information since P = P* > c. Now P* is found by
equating eqs. (1) and (2):
P* = (1+r)c.                                          (3)
With P = P*, 
1 q
premium
= p  = c > 0. If there are no discount firms,
Premium firms will earn positive profit.
More formally, what we have just described is the following
perfect Bayesian Klein-Leffler Equilibrium.
Firms: A certain X(P*) of the potential firms enter, produce
high quality, and charge price P* in the first period. A firm
continues to do this in subsequent periods unless it has ever11
deviated by producing low quality or charging a price other than
P*, in which case it switches to always producing low quality
and charging some price P. Unless some firm has thus deviated,
no new entry occurs. If some firm does deviate, a new firm
enters to replace it, adopting the strategy just described.
Consumers: Consumers buy randomly from the X(P*) firms that
enter in equilibrium, except, if any firm ever deviates,
consumers never buy from that firm, but are willing to buy from
the entrant that replaces that firm.
  As argued in Section I, profit persists in this
equilibrium. The lucky X(P*) firms that operate in equilibrium
all earn positive profits, but no entrant would attract any
customers, either matching the price (P*) or charging a lower
price. These firms earn a rent to the consumer belief that they
will produce quality. How this belief originates is beyond the
scope of the model, but it is self-confirming; a firm expected
to produce high quality will do so and will continue to do so.
There are many other equilibria in this model, as is common
in infinitely repeated games. The most notable is the following
simple Pessimistic Equilibrium in which reputation does not
work.12
Firms: No firms enter. If a firm did enter, it would produce low
quality and charge some price P.
Consumers: Consumers would not buy from any firm that entered.
In the Pessimistic Equilibrium, consumer beliefs about
product quality are pessimistic, and these beliefs are self-
confirming. A firm that entered and claimed it was going to
charge P* and produce high quality would, rationally, not be
believed. This is true despite the fact that, if consumers did
believe the firm, and the firm expected them to believe it, the
firm would then have incentive to produce high quality.
The Incomplete Information Case: Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection
 Now suppose both types of firms exist, Discount and
Premium, so consumers cannot be sure which firms they face. The
reputation equilibrium just described breaks down. If Discount
firms exist, with higher cost than Premium firms, profit for a
Discount firm when q = 1 is:
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Discount firms will not set q = 1 if P = P*. To assure that all
firms set q = 1, either (a) the price must be above P* to induce
Discount firms to set q = 1, or (b) Premium firms must have some
method of differentiating themselves from Discount firms to
reveal their type.
Condition (a) could support an equilibrium which we will
call the Inefficient Klein-Leffler Equilibrium. Suppose the
price is P** = (1+r)c , defined as the price high enough to
support a reputation equilibrium with just Discount firms. A
fortiori, P** is high enough to induce Premium firms to provide
high quality. However, market output will be smaller because of
the higher price, so only X(P**) firms will enter. The identity
of the X(P**) firms that consumers expect to produce high
quality is arbitrary and can include any mix of Premium and
Discount firms. It could even consist entirely of Discount
firms, a curious result. Premium firms would not enter and
undercut the price for the same reason as in the Pessimistic
Equilibrium described in the previous section: the entrants
would be expected to produce low quality, and would attract no
customers.
10
                    
10  In fact, this equilibrium persists even in a model in which there is
complete information and consumers know which firms are Premium. Knowing that
a firm has low cost of producing high quality is not sufficient to induce
consumers to buy from that firm, since consumer know that the firm could make14
Condition (b) is required for Premium firms to
differentiate themselves. If they can do this, and consumers
expect Premium firms to produce high quality, then an efficient
Reputation equilibrium can result. The equilibrium is as
follows.
Firms: A certain X(P*) of the Premium firms enter, expend
S* = (1+r)c in initial costs, and, in the first period, produce
high quality and charge price P* = (1+r)c. A firm continues to
do this in subsequent periods unless it has ever deviated by
producing low quality or charging a price other than P*, in
which case it switches to always producing low quality and
charging some price P. Discount firms never enter, but if one
did, it would choose S = 0 and produce low quality. Unless some
firm has deviated, no new entry occurs. If some firm does
                                                                 
even greater short-term profit with low quality. The successful firm is the
one that consumers expect to produce high quality, not the firm that has low
costs of producing high quality. Expectations are exogenous to the model,
which requires only that they be consistent and self-confirming in any Nash
equilibrium. Thus, if Firms 1 and 2 are Discount, and Firms 3 and 4 are
Premium, the most intuitive  equilibrium  has consumers expecting Firms 1 and
2 to produce low quality, if they ever produce, and Firms 3 and 4 to produce
high quality. However, an equally valid equilibrium has consumers expecting
only Firm 4 to produce high quality, and a third valid equilibrium has
consumers expecting only Firms 1 and 2 to produce high quality. This point
about Nash equilibrium, though basic, is not generally understood. Many
economists use implicit equilibrium refinements such as "Consumers expect
identical firms to behave identically," or "Consumers expect a firm with a
lower cost of producing high quality to be no less likely to produce high
quality than any other firm that they expect to produce high quality." These
may or may not be reasonable restrictions on consumer beliefs, but they go
beyond well-accepted equilibrium concepts. Note, too, such expectations rely
on consumers knowing firms' costs as well as firms' identities, a dubious
assumption.15
deviate, a new firm enters to replace it, adopting the strategy
just described.
Consumers: Consumers buy randomly from the X(P*) firms that
enter in equilibrium, except, if any firm deviates in its choice
of S, P, or q, consumers never buy from that firm, but are
willing to buy from the entrant that replaces that firm.
Let us see why this is an equilibrium. First, discount
firms have no incentive to enter. Discount firms that simply
plan to hit and run---that is to produce low quality until they
are caught at the end of the first period---will not undertake
such expenditure if 
0 q
discount
= p  =  r 1
P
+  -  r 1
S
+   < 0. Thus, with
P = P* = (1+r)c, the minimum value of S, denoted by S*, that
will prevent entry by Discount firms equals P*. Given the
equilibrium values of S* and P*, 
0 q
discount
= p  =  . 0 c c r 1
r 1
r 1
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if it produces high quality, which we have already shown is an
equilibrium operating strategy for them if P = P*. Thus, Premium
firms are also indifferent between entering and staying out, and
we have a Nash equilibrium.16
Notice, in this equilibrium, only Premium firms operate, so
production is efficient, but all profit is dissipated by
expenditure on sunk items. Thus, the efficiency in operation is
offset exactly by the inefficiency in the means by which high-
quality firms are identified to consumers. Also, the equilibrium
value of S is unique: the smallest value that deters Discount
firms from entering equals the largest value that induces
Premium firms to enter.
As before, and as is usual in signaling models, other
equilibria exist, including pooling equilibria in which Premium
and Discount firms behave the same as each other. These include
the Pessimistic Equilibrium, in which no firm ever produces high
quality, and equilibria in which consumers' strategy is to
ignore the conspicuous spending, S, in which case S fails to be
a signal of Premium status and merely becomes a sign of odd,
non-profit-maximizing behavior by a firm. The equilibrium we
have focussed on does, however, show how signaling by
conspicuous spending can result in an equilibrium in which
quality is high and is produced by the firms that can produce it
at least cost.
In the model in this section, Premium firms that invest in
conspicuous spending to differentiate themselves from Discount
firms earn zero profit, given the level of conspicuous spending.17
However, complete profit dissipation need not occur in general,
as will be discussed in the next section.
3. Discussion of the Profit Dissipation Result: A Caveat
The preceding section shows that there exists a
separating equilibrium in which Premium firms will enter and
produce high quality because the price is high enough, but
discount firms will not enter and produce low quality because a
one-time requirement of conspicuous spending on sunk, firm-
specific items deters them.
  In our model, we assumed the cost of low quality was zero.




premium p = p . Thus, in equilibrium, the Premium
firms’ operating profit is dissipated by the conspicuous
spending  which deters entry by Discount firms. Not only might
Premium firms have a lower marginal cost of delivering high
quality than Discount firms, however, they might also be able to
produce low quality more cheaply. In that case, in equilibrium






premium       r 1
* S
+ .  Premium firms earn positive
profit, even with the necessity of conspicuous spending at a
level that deters Discount firms from imitation. In general,
with: a) a quality-assuring price above the competitive, zero-
profit level, b) firms differing in the marginal cost of
producing high quality, and c) conspicuous spending by low cost18
firms to signal quality, profit will be completely dissipated
only if all firms have the same marginal cost of delivering the
lowest possible quality. Otherwise positive profit remains for
firms that produce high quality.19
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